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BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa), as well as other rising powers countries such 
as the Gulf States or Turkey, have entered the 
development arena by expanding their relation- 
ships with low-income countries. A widespread 
perception is that these countries are establishing 
new forms of engagement, mainly under the 
‘South–South Cooperation’ framework, which can 
be defined as: (1) two-way or equal partner 
relationships, as opposed to the engagement of 
traditional donors that is seen as relying 
on conditionality; and (2) extending cooperation 
beyond aid flows to include trade, investment, 
finance and other flows. 
Other views, however, suggest that the significance 
of engagement from these countries is still small 
compared to traditional OECD donors, and that 
some aid allocation behaviours do not consider 
governance issues or the needs of poorer countries. 
This potentially new cooperation framework 
translates in practice into a different type of economic 
engagement from the rising powers. To analyse this 
question empirically, we examined the economic 
engagement footprint of the rising powers in SSA, 
which constitutes an aggregated approximation of 
their impact as external actors and cooperation 
partners on the continent. Our findings can be 
summarised as follows:
Rising powers are important economic partners 
for sub-Saharan Africa regarding trade and FDI 
The importance of rising powers’ economic 
engagement in SSA has increased dramatically in 
the last decade, at the expense of OECD countries. 
China (the region’s main trading partner), along 
with other rising powers, constitutes 30 per cent 
of total trade with the region. This speed of change 
is highlighted by the dramatic increase in China’s 
share of exports to SSA, increasing from 4.5 per 
cent in 2000 to 14.5 per cent in 2010. India, China, 
South Africa and the Gulf States are also key 
sources of FDI in the region. However, when it 
comes to aid flows, only China is a significant donor 
in the region, although the importance of India and 
the Gulf States is increasing significantly over time.
 
In addition, the nature of this engagement between 
rising powers and SSA is strengthening, since 
all flows (exports, imports, FDI, development 
cooperation) are increasing over time.
Large sector concentration of trade, while more 
diversified FDI portfolio
Trade between rising powers and SSA, especially 
exports from Africa to the rising powers, is 
concentrated in natural resources and products of 
very little value added. On the other hand, FDI 
flows from rising powers to Africa appear to show 
some diversification towards important sectors 
for growth such as services.
Rising powers are not a homogenous group 
When it comes to economic engagement, the rising 
powers are by no means a homogenous group. 
Exports from SSA to rising powers show similar 
patterns. However, there are significant differences 
in the allocation of aid flows and FDI sector 
and country composition across rising powers.  
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The role of rising powers has become increasingly important in international 
development. Some of these countries base their development assistance strategy 
on the ‘South–South Cooperation’ framework, centred on a notion of equal 
partner relationships and extending cooperation beyond aid flows. Our research 
shows that rising powers’ economic engagement with countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) is not that different to that of OECD countries in relation to sector 
and country allocations of aid, trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). As such, 
the ‘South–South’ cooperation framework does not yet appear to be distinctive 
when looking at aggregate economic flows.
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Significant similarities between rising 
powers and OECD countries
Using a similarity index to assess the trade 
and FDI flows, we found that significant 
similarities appear, especially regarding 
trade flows and, to a lesser extent, 
investment, between some rising powers 
and some OECD countries. For example, 
although Brazil is similar to China regarding 
the sector composition of imports from 
SSA, these are also very similar to the US 
or the UK. China and France, or South 
Africa and the US, also show similar sector 
investment patterns in SSA. 
Rising powers’ aid allocation behaviour 
does not translate into significant 
differences in country allocation vis-a-vis 
some OECD countries
While aid allocation of rising powers in SSA 
is perhaps more concentrated in natural 
resource-intensive countries and countries 
with a stronger UN affinity (that is, recipient 
countries which commonly vote alongside the 
aid provider in the UN), contrary to what some 
commentators suggest, allocation in SSA 
from rising powers such as China or India does 
not seem more concentrated in countries 
with higher income per capita, corruption 
or trade links than the allocation by some 
OECD countries. For example, the concen-
tration curve of China’s aid flows according to 
the country’s intensity of natural resources 
appears very similar to that of the UK.
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Policy implications
Looking forward, the importance of the rising powers’ engagement in SSA is likely 
to increase in the near future given the recent trends and economic difficulties in 
OECD countries. 
• Trade flows – this engagement does not appear particularly beneficial for SSA 
countries in terms of the sophistication and technological content of exports or 
encouraging export diversification and integrating in global value chains. 
• Aid flows – there appear to be some complementarities between rising power 
priorities and other traditional donors, although there is also significant overlap in 
other sectors such as infrastructure. 
• FDI flows – from the rising powers, especially investments in services (such as 
financial services, software, IT and communications), which present the most important 
opportunity to contribute to higher growth and development in the SSA region. 
As a result, it is important to ensure that rising powers strengthen FDI ties with 
SSA and offer market access to SSA exports, especially non-commodity exports.  
Overall the economic engagement footprint suggests that given the allocation of 
economic flows observed, the ‘South–South’ cooperation framework does not yet 
appear to be distinctive regarding aggregate economic relationships. More work is 
needed in order to understand whether this form of cooperation is expected to impact 
development ‘differently’ from other forms of cooperation and move from 
development rhetoric. A critical element of this would be understanding and 
quantifying the more micro channels and specific projects under which the ‘South–
South cooperation’ framework is expected to have a ‘differential’ impact on 
development as compared to more traditional donor frameworks.
